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Decentralisation is invariably among the recommendations that international organisations such as the 
World Bank make for an enhancement of social provisions, and particularly a better targeting of social 
assistance regimes, in Eastern and Central Europe. However, theoretical literature as wel as empirical 
research suggests that decentralisation is not by defintion a panacea, especially when it concerns the 
transfers of competencies in the matter of social protection systems. It is true that there are arguments to 
promote redistributive activity at lower levels of government but whith regard to policies aimed at 
redistribution and reducing poverty (and welfare generosity) the assumption that redistribution is best 
organised at the central level is rather dominant. Fundamental constraints on redistribution by lower level 
governments would -according to this line of reasoning- facilitate a 'race to the bottom'. This paper 
investigates the relationship between the generosity of social assistance benefits and several dimensions of 
decentralisation (the administration, decision-making and funding of social assistance schemes) at two 
levels of government (the substate and the local level) in 21 OECD countries by means of a fuzzy set 
analysis. The results indicate that social asssitance benefits are more adequate in countries where the 
decision-making, funding and administration of social assistance schemes is controlled by the central 
government and in countries where central or substate governments set the basic social assistance rates 
and housing benefits while sharing funding liabilities with the local government level. When Central and 
Eastern European countries opt for decentralisation as an instrument of poverty alleviation – through a 
better targeting of benefits -, prudence is called for the fact that there might be a trade-off between the 
transfer of competencies to lowel levels of government and the generosity of welfare programmes. 
 
Published as : 
Devolution of social security arrangements 
in: 
Cerami, A. and Vanhuysse, P. (eds), Post-Communist Welfare Pathways. Theorising Social 
Policy Transformations in Central and Eastern Europe, Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke. 
 




Until the late 1980s, the main instrument of minimum income protection in 
Eastern and Central European countries was near-universal employment at low 
pay accompanied by work-based welfare systems, together with subsidised prices 
and services. It was only in the 1990s, when the transition from communism to a 
market economy was resulting in unprecedented levels of unemployment and 
poverty, that non-contributory social safety nets were introduced to supplement 
the existing  labour-centred social security systems. In other words, the social 
assistance regimes  of Central and Eastern Europe are still very young, and 
benefit entitlements are low, often well below the poverty line (Cantillon et al, 
forthcoming).  
 
Another important legacy of the socialist era is a tradition of centralised policy-
making that leaves little room for local anti-poverty initiatives. Decentralisation is 
invariably among the recommendations that international organisations such as 
the World Bank make for an enhancement of social provisions, and particularly a 
better targeting of social assistance regimes, in Eastern and Central Europe 
(Dillinger, 1999; Litvack et al, 1998; Kaiser, 2006; World Bank 2007). Many 
countries have in the past decade indeed implemented significant reforms of their 
intergovernmental fiscal frameworks and public administrations with a view to 
increasing the role of local governments in social services (World Bank, 2007). 
However, research suggests that decentralisation is not a panacea. Hölsch and 
Krause (2004), in a study into the relationship between the degree of 
decentralisation and poverty reduction through social assistance in five countries, 
find that social assistance schemes with a medium degree of decentralisation 
(France, Germany and Finland) are indeed more effective in alleviating poverty 
than either extremely centralised (UK) or extremely decentralised systems 
(Italy). 
 
This paper considers the relationship between the level of government where 
social assistance is organised and the generosity of the ultimate safety net of 
universal or general social assistance. In their typology of social assistance 
systems, Eardley et al (1996) define general social assistance benefits as means-
tested benefits for all households under certain income threshold, irrespective of 
whether they belong to specific population groups, such as the elderly or the 
disabled. We intend to ascertain whether the the way competencies are divided 
between central government on the one hand and substate and local government 
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on the other is important to the degree in which minimum income protection 
aresocially effective . To this end, we rely on OECD estimates of the guaranteed 
net minimum income for four hypothetical household types under a universal 
social assistance scheme. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 explains why the decentralisation of 
social assistance schemes is considered as a necessary condition for effectively 
combatting poverty in the case of Central and Eastern European countries. 
Subsequently, section 3 summarizes the advantages an disadvantages of a 
transfer of competencies in the field of redistributive and anti-poverty policies as 
mentioned in the theoretical literature. A definition of decentralisation and its 
different types are given in section 4. Section 5 deals with the different ways in 
which competencies on the subject of social assistence are organized in 30 OECD 
countries. Section 6 contains some methodological notes while the empirical 
results are presented in section 7. Section 8 concludes with a brief discussion. 
 
 
2. Social assistance programmes in the Central and Eastern European 
Countries  : decentralisation as an instrument of targeting 
 
In Central and Eastern Europe, basic social assistance safety nets to supplement 
labour-centred social security were developed only recently. Until the late 1980s, 
the main instrument of minimum income protection in Eastern and Central 
European countries was near-universal employment at low pay accompanied by 
work-based welfare systems (e.g. public pensions), together with regulated and 
subsidised prices (of food, clothing, housing etc.) and services (e.g. (nearly) free 
health care and education). For those incapable to take active part in the working 
life social assistance systems provided a safety net (Cerami, 2005). However, as 
Milanovic (1995) states, neither in terms of its size nor the concentration on the 
poor did social assistance have the role that it typically has in the West. In most 
of the Central and Eastern European countries social assistance was relegated to 
a subsidiary role. On the one hand, this was due to the fact that poverty was not 
(at least officialy) widespread ; on the other hand there was little sympathy for 
the poor as such (Milanovic, 1995). Policymakers saw poverty as a social 
pathology – experienced by individuals who for some reason were unable to 
work. Highly selective and stigmatised services were developed to cater for them 
(Cantillon & Van Mechelen, forthcoming).  
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With the transformation from central planned to market economies, social 
assistance schemes became increasingly important as a part of the Central and 
Eastern European social protection systems. The schemes were meant to meet 
the new emergent needs caused by the deteriation of the economic situation 
(Cerami, 2005).  The proces of transition took place against the background of an 
unfavorable economic climate and political and economic forces arguing (under 
the influence of recommendations by international organisations like the IMF, 
World Bank and the OECD) for neoliberal restructuring (privatization, elimination 
of enterprise ubsidies etc.). Hence, structural reforms were taking place within 
the framework of declining economic output, tight macro economic policies and 
severe austerity measures (Boeri & Keese, 1992 ;  Czike et al., 2002). Because of 
i) massive job losses (and unemployment) due to profound economic and labour 
markted changes and ii) a considerable decrease of the living standard of many 
households as a result of the removal of indirect subsididies which made 
consumer price rise considerably (World Bank, 2004 ; Milanovic, 1995), 
significant parts of the population faced a deterioration of their socio-economic 
situation. This was true all the more because old state-run protection and 
services were disappearing. After all, (neoliberal) restructuring also meant 
curtailing social spending. Social policy as it existed under communism was 
considered rather excessive and too costly (Cerami, 2005 ; Czike et al.). 
Diminished financial capacity made it hard to continue providing the same level of 
social provision as in the pre-transition era and as a result the existing welfare 
institutions were dismantled and subsidies for utilities in general withdrawn.  
 
Because of the developments mentioned, the transition created unprecedented 
levels of post-war poverty.  In response to the increasing poverty levels, non-
contributory social safety nets were introduced in the 1990s to supplement the 
existing labour-centred social security systems of which the coverage is very low, 
due to the growth of employment in the informal economy, that does not offer 
any social security protection.  
 
Today, in most of the CEE countries the right to a guaranteed minimum 
subsistence is defined by the constitution or by consequent laws (Cerami, 2005). 
One of the key features of the social assistance schemes in these countries is the 
establishment of a Minimum Income Level (also called Guaranteed Income Level) 
as a poverty threshold. All households and citizens that find themselves below the 
poverty line established by law have the right to social assistance benefits. These 
provisions can take the form of cash, in-kind benefits or services. The amount is 
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calculated as the difference between the official subsistence level and the family 
or individual disposable income. 
 
However, the market-oriented reforms and the consequent increase in the 
number of poor people has placed the social assistance schemes under great 
financial pressure. These kind of ‘final’ safety-nets have been called to limit the 
negative effects of reforms carried out in other sectors (Cerami, 2005) and 
national governments have found themselves urged to carry out reforms because 
of budgetary constraints. The central issue in these reforms of social assistance 
has become how to improve targeting. As Milanovic asserts (1995), ‘if poverty is 
on the rise and money is scarce targeting is the only option’. 
 
In order to enhance a better targeting of social assistance regimes in Eastern and 
Central Europe, international organisations such as the World Bank argue strongly 
in favour of the decentralisation of existing social assistance programmes 
(Dillinger, 1999; Litvack et al, 1998; Kaiser, 2006; World Bank 2007). Many 
countries have in the past decade indeed implemented significant reforms of their 
intergovernmental fiscal frameworks and public administrations with a view to 
increasing the role of local governments in social services (World Bank, 2007). 
Today, most Eastern European social assistance schemes are  regulated at the 
national level, although the decision-making powers of local governments have 
already become more substantial. For example, in Poland national legislation 
defines minimum and maximum benefits, but it is up to local Social Assistance 
Centres to decide how much a particular family should receive (OECD 2004). 
Further decentralisation is on the political agenda, as it is in Slovakia (World Bank 
forthcoming). In Latvia, the nationally established Guaranteed Minimum Income 
is merely a basic rate and municipalities are free to increase benefit amounts in 
accordance with local needs and financial possibilities (Gassmann 2005). The case 
of Latvia illustrates quite clearly the risks associated with decentralising both 
financial responsibilities and power of decision on social assistance schemes: the 
deprived regions, where poverty is most widespread, are least able to provide an 
adequate safety net (World Bank  forthcoming).  
 
Yet, the theoretical literature as wel as empirical research suggests that 
decentralisation is not by definition a panacea, especially when social assistance 
schemes are meant as an important instrument for combating poverty. Hölsch 
and Krause (2004), in a study into the relationship between the degree of 
decentralisation and poverty reduction through social assistance in five countries, 
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find that social assistance schemes with a medium degree of decentralisation 
(France, Germany and Finland) are indeed more effective in alleviating poverty 




3. Advantages and disadvantages of transfer of competency : the 
theoretical literature and empirical evidence 
 
3.1 Theoretical framework 
 
A significant amount of economic and political literature is available on the 
potential relationship between the level where redistribution is organised and 
(re)distributive outcomes (through the generosity of welfare programmes and/or 
the redistributive capacity of tax sytems). 
 
In recommending a decentralisation of social security services in Central and 
Eastern Europe, the World Bank refers to an argument that is frequently 
encountered in the theoretical literature on the possible benefits of power transfer 
to lower levels of government: it is hypothesised that transferring competencies 
(including in the realm of social policy and social security) to local authorities 
creates more room for a policy that meets the needs and requirements of various 
local entities (Jung, 2005: 3, Bertels, 1994 : 156). The underlying assumption is 
that, as far the needs and preferences of the citizenry is concerned, there may be 
significant differences within a country between various local entities. Being 
‘closer to the people’ (Masayoshi, 2004 ; Faguet, 1997), local authorities are 
more aware than central government of the needs and preferences of residents in 
their own jurisdiction. Consequently, local authorities are able to be more 
responsive to those needs and they are better placed to design programmes and 
services which suit the preferences of local residents (Masayoshi, 2004 ; 
Prud’homme, 1995). In other words, at a local level, programmes and services 
are more easily tailored to the requirements of local residents and issues1 (De 
Vries, ). Moreover, local governments may be more efficient in administering the 
programmes, as they may be better informed than the central authorities of 
practical circumstances affecting the local implementation of policies (Begg et al., 
1993). It is also argued that not only do local authorities possess more adequate 
knowledge to respond to local needs, but, for reasons of accountability, they are 
                                                 
1
 “Local solutions for local problems” (Miller, 2002) 
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also more readily inclined  to take into account citizens’ needs and preferences 
when outlining policy. After all, decentralisation permits decision-makers in 
decentralised units to be held directly accountable to the local citizenry through 
local elections (Faguet, 1997). 
 
The recommendation of the World Bank for social services to be decentralised 
also finds substance in other theoretical arguments. Besides allowing for a better 
alignment of policy to local needs and preferences, a decentralised approach 
(including in relation to social services) is said to create more room for policy 
innovation and experimentation. This argument is commonly heard in the context 
of federal states and is hence often referred to as ‘laboratory federalism’2. 
According to this view, federalism provides fertile conditions for policy innovation 
because it creates, at the lower level, multiple governments any one of which 
might take the lead in experimenting with new solutions; it can thus unleash 
policy innovation on a local level that would not win sufficient support on a 
national level (Hueghlin, 2006). Once given policies have been shown to work, 
one may see a demonstration effect whereby new policies (or policy models) are 
taken up by other decentralised units (sometimes resistant jurisdiction) or by the 
central government. (Hueghlin, 2006). However, this argument is not restricted 
to federal states: it may in fact hold for any country where both policy-making 
and implementation are transferred to lower levels of government.  
 
A better alignment of policy to local needs and preferences and the creation of 
room for innovation and experimentation are commonly heard arguments in 
favour not only of power transfer in the field of social security services, but of 
decentralisation in general. An argument that is specific to power transfer in 
social security (particularly in the context of redistribution of wealth) concerns the 
aspect of solidarity: solidarity, so it is claimed, is greater within small 
(homogenous) entities than in large (heterogeneous) ones. In order for 
(generous) redistributive schemes to work, citizens must feel mutual commitment 
and a willingness to participate in insurance and redistribution (Making Sense of 
Subsidiarity). Especially those who are net contributors must feel strong solidarity 
with the beneficiaries (Weinstock, 2001). As there is a greater connectedness 
between citizens at the local than at the national level, there shall be a greater 
willingness to show solidarity and to redistribute locally than nationally (Pauly, 
1973). In the simplest of terms, one could say that the rich care more about the 
poor to the extent that they live nearby. It is also suggested that willingness to 
                                                 
2
 Elucidation Bryce 
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redistribute may be stronger for the poor nearby if only because the desire to do 
good is conditional on the perception of bad circumstances, and bad 
circumstances close at hand are more likely to be perceived than those at a 
distance (Pauly in Ashworth et al., 2002). Moreover, solidarity may be based on 
reciprocal altruism. In other words, people’s willingness to help othes may be 
dependent upon their conviction that those others would also be willing to help 
them. Hence, ‘knowing’ the other individual will enhance one’s willingness to 
cooperate. And consequently people will also be more willing to support a 
collective programme to help the poor in their own jurisdiction (Ashworth et al., 
2002).  
 
However, transfer of powers to lower levels of government may also entail some 
disadvantages. As Prud’homme (1995) asserts, “there are serious drawbacks that 
should be considered in designing any decentralisation programme”. 
Consequently, the theoretical literature puts forward a range of arguments in 
favour of centralised policymaking (e.g. economies of scale, risk-sharing, etc), 
including in relation to social protection and programme generosity in particular 
(the actual topic of this paper)   
 
First and foremost, it is argued3 that transfer of competencies to lower levels of 
government is a means of restricting the growth and size of government, and 
consequently its (social) expenditures (cf. infra). This argument is based on the 
so-called Leviathan hypothesis, which states that “the size of public sector varies 
inversely with the decentralisation of the ‘fisc’” (Brenan & Buchanan). The 
underlying reasoning is founded on two assumptions (Obinger, et al., 2005). 
First, governments are so-called revenue-maximising Leviathans (Fiva, 2006). 
The interests of bureaucrats are always advanced by an increase in the budgets 
they command and the level of activity they undertake (among other reasons 
because opportunistic governments employ public expenditure to assure political 
support). Consequently public policy will tend to be distorted in the direction of 
excessive taxing and spending (Begg et al., 1993. (making sense of subsidiarity), 
which leads to an expansion of the public sector. In other words, political 
centralisation enhances the growth of the Leviathan by creating a monopoly with 
unlimited power to extract revenues from society.Conversely, the hypothesis that 
the size of government declines as taxes and expenditures are decentralised is 
founded on the assumption that the decentralisation of fiscal powers stimulates 
competition between the constituent units. The Leviathan view predicts that such 
                                                 
3
 Particularly in the ‘public choice’ literature 
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competition should always lead to lower levels of taxation, expenditure and 
overall government activity (Begg et al., 1993) because competition among 
jurisdictions provides taxpayers with a valuable escape option that makes it 
harder for Leviathans to exploit them. And this limitation on the expansion of 
public expenditure also affects the generosity and coverage of social 
programmes, since social expenditures account for as much as 50 percent of total 
government outlays (Obinger et al., 2005).  
 
Competition between local entities due to the mobility of citizens and capital is 
also at the heart of the fiscal federalism literature, where it is asserted that social 
redistribution is best organised at the highest, central, level. A key element in this 
theory is the notion of inter-jurisdictional competition, as described in the Tiebout 
hypothesis: if citizens are faced with an array of communities that offer different 
types or levels of public goods and services, then each citizen will choose the 
community that best satisfies his or her own particular demands. Individuals 
effectively reveal their preferences by "voting with their feet." Citizens with high 
demands for public goods will concentrate themselves in communities with high 
levels of public services and high taxes, while those with low demands will choose 
other communities with low levels of public services and low taxes. More 
specifically, the socially weak shall tend to move to regions where social benefits 
are high, while better-off households shall be inclined to move out of such 
regions, because they are made to carry the burden of generous redistribution in 
the shape of high taxation and social contributions (Bertels etal, 1994). The same 
mechanism is assumed to apply to the mobility of enterprises and thus capital 
(Oates theorem). Industry, too, will tend to shun regions where the burden of 
taxation is high. Regions with generous protection schemes shall consequently 
face rising costs and an increasingly narrow financial base. A decentralisation of 
redistribution policy will thus compel regions to compete with one another in 
trying to become the least attractive to individuals who are highly dependent 
upon social protection. Each region (or indeed country) shall need to limit social 
benefits to avoid an influx of needy persons and to attract the socially better off 
(e.g. the high-skilled) and industry. In the longer term, this dynamics will lead to 
a 'race to the bottom', whereby social protection is gradually eroded. In engaging 
such a race to the bottom, states are attempting to attract economic 
development by reducing the cost of government. States can also compete by 
trying to reduce directly the non-fiscal costs associated with carrying out 
businesses, by reducing state regulation (Obinger et al, 2005). 
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In addition, it is pointed out in the literature on ‘political institutionalism’ that 
decentralisation of competency in social policy can have a negative impact on the 
volume of social expenditures (and consequently on benefit generosity, too). 
Institutional features, it is argued, can be important determinants of welfare state 
development. And one of those features is decentralised arrangements: they 
impede the expansion of the welfare states (Castles, 1999). Fragmentation of 
power between multiple actors and levels of government increases the number of 
institutional veto points (that is, points in the political process at which 
legislations can be blocked). A relatively large number of veto points in a 
country’s constitutional structure depresses welfare state expansion and may 
possibly result in suboptimal policy outcomes and lowest common denominator 
policies, as they enable relatively small groups to obstruct legislation (Bradley et 
al., 2001 ; Bonoli, 2001 ; Obinger, 1998).According to this reasoning, a 
decentralisation of social protection schemes in Central and Eastern European 
Countries may impede the further development of these welfare states.  
 
Finally, it is argued in the literature that there is a risk involved in decentralising 
social protection programmes if one takes inadequate account of the revenue 
capacity of the local entities concerned. If those local entities must fund social 
programmes largely from own revenues, then some – i.e. the poorer ones – may 
find it hard to provide (sufficiently) generous schemes in view of their limited 
resources. Transfer of financial competencies within the context of well-
functioning intergovernmental fiscal system that ensures adequate sustainable 
and equitable financing of benefits and programmes across local entities could 
resolve this problem, on condition that a system of earmarked financing is in 
place. If not, then there is a considerable risk that funds designated for social 
programmes will be diverted elsewhere (Kaiser, 2006 ; World Bank, 2007) 
 
3.2 Empirical evidence  
 
The impact of decentralisation on social redistribution and on benefit generosity in 
particular cannot be assessed merely on the basis of theoretical arguments. It 
would appear that for every argument in favour of decentralisation there is an 
argument against.  
 
However, there is relatively little empirical data on the relationship between 
decentralisation and benefit levels. Moreover, existing studies provide no 
evidence of an unequivocal relationship between (de)centralisation of social 
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programmes and benefit generosity. On the one hand, it is said that concerns 
over the ‘race to the bottom’ have generally been overstated (Moreno Mc Ewen ; 
Heuglin) and that little emprical evidence is to be found indicating that a 
downwards spiral in case of decentralisation is likely to occur (e.g. Berry & 
Fording, 2003) Some are mentioning elegibility rather than benefit competition in 
this context (Berry & Fording, 2003) or suggest that instead of a race to the 
bottom even the opposite evolution might occur. For instance, Moreno & Trelles 
(2005) indicate that, in the case of Spain, the decentralisation of welfare 
competencies has stimulated policy innovation ending up in a ‘race to the top’ 
that has minimized the alleged detrimental consequences for state-national 
solidarity. Moreover, Beramendi argues that the preferences of political actors for 
decentralization are likely to be afftected by the level of regional inequality and 
redistributive spending rather than the other way armound (Beramendi in 
Ravishankar, 2004). In societies prone to low redistribution decentralisation in 
more probable because subnational –units with diverging needs resist risk-
sharing. Low redistribution and benfits thus would exist because of lacking cross-
regional solidarity (Jung, 2005). On the other hand  Hölsch and Krause (2004), in 
a study into the relationship between the degree of decentralisation and poverty 
reduction through social assistance in five countries, find that social assistance 
schemes with a medium degree of decentralisation (France, Germany and 
Finland) are indeed more effective in alleviating poverty than either extremely 
centralised (UK) or extremely decentralised systems (Italy). Summarizing : the 
discussion on whether decentralization increases or decreases social welfare and 
efficiency remains –both on theoretical and empirical grounds- an open debate. 
 
 
4. Types of decentralisation 
 
This paper investigates the relationship between decentralisation and social 
assistence benefit levels. Important to note is that there is no consensus on the 
definition of decentralization (Sharma, 2004) : “decentralization seems often to 
mean whatever the person using the term wants it to mean” (Bird,in Sharma 
2004). In line with the World Bank literature, decentralization in this paper is 
considered as an umbrella term for all forms of transfer of powers and resources 
from higher to lower levels in a political system” (see amongst others Rondinelli 
et al., 1983 ; Manor, 1997, Kaiser, 2006 ; Litvack et al., 1998). Three types of 
decentralization can be distinguished. First, deconcentration occurs when the 
central government hands over some of its administrative authority or 
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responsibility to lower levels within the central government ministries and 
agencies (Rondinelli et al, 1983). Deconcentration allows the central government 
to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery without losing 
control over the delivery of that particular service (Litvack et al, 1998). Second, 
delegation refers to a situation in which the central government transfers 
responsibility for decision-making and administration of public functions to local 
governments or semiautonomous organisations that are not wholly controlled by 
the central government but are ultimately accountable to it (Kaiser, 2006).  
Third, devolution refers to a situation in which the central government transfers 
authority for decision-making, finance and management to quasi-autonomous 
units of local government (Kaiser, 2006). 
 
 In investigating de link between decentralisation and social assistance benefit 
levels the three different types of transfer of competencies will be considered.  
According to some empirical studies the form of decentralization appears to be an 
important area for analysis in assessing social policy outcomes. For instance, the 
overall pictures that emerges from a studie of Ravishankar (2004) is that political 
decentralisation has far a greater impact on welfare state spending than fiscal 
decentralisation. Yet, with respect to the latter some findings point to the fact 
that countries in which reponsibility for spending is decentralized, but 
responsibility for revenue-raising is centralized, tend to spend more than other 
countries, other things being equal. By contrast, in countries where both revenue-
raising and welfare spending are decentralized, expenditure levels appear lower 
(Moreno & Mc Ewen, 2005 ; Fiva , 2006). 
 
 
5. General safety nets and decentralisation in OECD countries 
 
Most of the 30 OECD countries considered in this study have some kind of system 
of means-tested benefits. Moreover, in the majority of the countries4 these 
schemes have a universal character. In the strictest sense of the word, the 
prevailing social protection systems in the UK, Ireland, New Zealand and the US 
are not universal schemes that guarantee cash benefits to all the needy. The UK, 
Ireland and New Zealand have no universal safety net, but various 
                                                 
4
 Turkey has a system of conditional cash transfers which provides money to poor families contingent 
upon certain behaviour, usually investments in human capital such as sending children to school and 
meeting their basic health and nutritional needs. These benefits are not universal, but targeted at 
pregnant women and families with children.  
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complementary categorical schemes. In the United Kingdom, for instance, non-
able-bodied persons with insufficient resources can claim Income Support (if 
working fewer than 16 hours a week), able-bodied persons are entitled to an 
income-based Job Seekers Allowance (if working fewer than 16 hours a week), 
and low-income households working at least 16 hours a week are eligible for the 
Working Tax Credit. Because these programmes are closely aligned, they are 
often considered together as a universal guaranteed minimum income (e.g. 
Walker and Wiseman 2003). Minimum income provision in Ireland and New 
Zealand is organised along similar lines. The US, for its part, deviates in another 
sense: the federal government does not provide cash benefits for all needy 
households, but only food stamps and Medicaid. The Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families programme (TANF) does encompass means-tested cash benefits, 
but only to households with children.  
 
Generally speaking, social assistance regimes distinguish themselves from social 
security systems not only through the nature of the benefits involved, but also by 
how they are organised. Social assistance regimes are often characterised by a 
close involvement of local authorities in the implementation of regulations, and 
sometimes even in their concrete design (Saraceno). In most countries, these 
programmes are regulated largely by the central government. Yet, in some (like 
Hungary, Italy, Greece) the transfer of competencies is that far-reaching that the 
regions, provinces or municipalities  have entirely the freedom to(or not) 
establish and design their own systems. In these countries a minimum income is 
not always guaranteed to every citizen due to the fact that the choice of whether 
or not to establish a safety net is left to the municipalities or regions.  
 
Table 1 arranges the OECD countries by the manner in which their general social 
assistance programmes are decentralised. Under the general social assistance 
schemes, households often receive different types of means-tested benefits: a 
basic rate to cover the general cost of living (food, clothes, …) and supplementary 
benefits that are linked to specific costs (housing, heating, …). Households with 
children also receive family benefits or, as the case may be, specific allowances 
for lone parents, which may or may not be means-tested. These allowances are 
not always organised and provided at the same level of government. In Norway 
and Iceland, for example, social assistance claimants receive a centrally 
established housing allowance, while the level of the basic rate and other 
supplementary benefits is determined by every municipality separately. In order 
to ascertain in the empirical analysis which competency divisions provide for 
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socially effective benefits and which do not, we measure the degree of 
decentralisation for each of the three income components: the basic rates, the 
housing allowances and the other supplementary benefits 5. In table 1, we do not 
make this distinction, but we rather arrange the various countries by the level of 
government at which the total net income of the social assistance claimant is 
determined. This means that countries where the basic rates for social assistance 
claimants and housing allowances are the same across the nation, but where local 
government holds the explicit competency to decide on additional benefits, are 
subsumed under the group of regimes where the local authorities have decisive 
competency over the overall income package for social assistance recipients. A 
table has been added in appendix that provides a more detailed picture of the 
division of competency in individual countries. 
 
Table 1. Decentralisation of social assistance benefits in 27 OECD countries* (2004) 
 





New Zealand, United 
Kingdom, Slovak 
Republic 
To substate level: 
France 
 
To substate level: 
Austria, Canada, Italy, 
Spain, Switzerland, United 
States 
 
To local level: 
Czech Republic, Portugal, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 




* Korea, Mexico and Turkey do not appear in this classification due to a lack of reliable data 
Source: own data (see methodological notes) 
 
As it is showed in table 1, there is just one OECD country, namely Luxembourg, 
where general social assistance has not been decentralised in any way. That is to 
say, the Luxembourg central government has not transferred fiscal, political or 
administrative responsibilities to lower levels of government (Litvack et al, 1998). 
It is the central government that lays down the eligibility criteria and the benefit 
amounts (of basic rates as well as housing allowances and other supplementary 
benefits) and that carries the full financial burden of the system. The payment of 
benefits and the processing of new applications is taken care of by a single 
central body, the so-called Fonds National de Solidarité, which is directly under 
the national government’s control.  
 
                                                 
5
 Except in Canada, rate-setting and granting of child benefits is always taken care of by the central government. Because of this 
lack of variation, this variable was not included in the analyses.  
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In the other OECD countries, competencies are to some extent transferred to a 
substate or local level. In Ireland, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand 
and the Slovak Republic social assistance delivery is deconcentrated. Basic rates 
and supplementary benefits for social assistance recipients are regulated and 
financed by the central government and administered by regional (Ireland, 
Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom (standard rates)) or local (the 
Slovak Republic and the United Kingdom (housing benefits)) agencies which are 
under the direct supervision of the central government. 
 
Delegation is to be found in the case in France, albeit that the central government 
has retained power of decision in relation to the eligibility criteria and the level of 
social assistance  benefits and supplements. The central government regulates 
and finances, but leaves the implementation of the social assistance programme 
mostly to the departments, in cooperation with the municipalities. The main 
difference between France and a country such as Ireland is that, in Ireland, local 
and regional authorities are in no way involved, while in France they help shape 
social assistance policy, albeit that they have very few decision-making 
competencies.  
 
In the remaining OECD countries, either basic or supplementary benefits, or both, 
are devolved to lower levels of government. In Austria, Canada, Spain, 
Switzerland and the US, social assistance is devolved to substate level. In the 
first four of these countries, the provinces, regions or cantons have full 
competency in relation to both basic benefits and supplements for social 
assistance claimants. So each substate takes autonomous decisions with regard 
to the eligibility criteria, the benefit amounts, and the funding of the system as a 
whole. In Switzerland, the variation in benefit amounts between cantons is 
however restricted through national guidelines which, though not binding, are 
more or less adhered to by all cantons. In the United States, the broad outlines of 
minimum income protection are provided in federal programmes (largely financed 
by the federal authorities), such as  the Food Stamp Programme, Medicaid and 
TANF. However, individual states are free to develop and finance more broadly 
accessible and more generous social assistance programmes. In 1998, some 18 
of the 52 states had their own cash assistance programmes (Walker and 
Wiseman, 2003). In most countries where social assistance  is organised at 
substate level, local authorities are also involved in policy implementation, and 
sometimes also in its financing, but the degree to which this is the case may vary 
considerably from region to region.  
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In many OECD countries, the general social assistance regime has been devolved 
directly from central government to the municipalities. This implies first and 
foremost that the municipalities are made jointly responsible for the financial side 
of social assistance benefits and/or supplementary benefits. However, in most 
countries the central government does meet part of the cost. In Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany, Japan, Poland, Portugal and the Czech Republic, 
municipalities  receive a transfer per social assistant recipient that covers part of 
the social assistance benefit. The proportion that the municipality contributes to 
the basic allowance (i.e. excluding housing allowances and supplementary 
benefits) varies from 25% in Japan to 75% in Germany6. In Finland, Iceland, the 
Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, municipalities receive a general government 
grant which largely covers either the totality of their social expenditures (e.g. 
Sweden) or their expenses on means-tested benefits (e.g. the Netherlands). The 
size of the grant often depends on local indicators, such as the unemployment 
rate, the urbanisation rate,….  
 
In countries where social assistance programmes are funded with local resources, 
the local authorities generally have a say in determining benefit amounts. As 
Table 2 shows, however, the margin that municipalities have at their disposal 
varies strongly from country to country. In Japan and the Netherlands, benefit 
amounts, supplements and possible deviations thereof are laid down by law, so 
that little room is left for a municipal policy on social assistance benefits. In the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany and Sweden, the national legislator 
determines  how basic benefits and housing allowances should be calculated. Yet 
the municipalities have room to adapt the eventual social assistance income to 
the local socioeconomic context, as they can decide quasi-autonomously on the 
level of the supplementary benefits. Although little research has been conducted 
into this matter, it is generally assumed that, in these countries, minimum 
income protection of the poor varies strongly depending on where they live. 
Intercommunal differences in minimum protection  are probably the greatest in 
Belgium and Portugal, where only the basic amount is regulated nationally, while 
municipalities are left free to decide on eligibility criteria for and the benefit 
amounts of housing allowances and other supplements.  In Iceland, Norway and 
Poland, the municipalities can, within nationally imposed limits, even determine 
                                                 
6
 Portugal and the Czech Republic are not included here: in these countries, the municipalities carry the 
entire burden of supplementary benefits but they do not contribute to the basic rates.  
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the basic amounts. However, housing allowances are fixed at the national level in 
these countries.  
 
The most radical form of devolution, is found in Greece, Italy and Hungary. In 
these countries there is a total transfer of regulation, funding and implementation 
of the social assistance programme to local levels of government, The 
municipalities actually carry the full financial burden of social assistance, and in 
the case of Hungary and Italy, there even are no national social protection 
arrangements: the choice of whether or not to establish a safety net is left to the 
municipalities or regions. In practice, though, very few such schemes exist. In 
Italy, they are found most commonly in the Centre-Northern regions, and they 
are usually organised and run at the municipal level. Moreover, in Italy, most 
existing minimum income provisions, both at the national and at the municipal 
level, are categorial (Eardley et al 1996, Saraceno 2002, Sacchi and Bastagli 
2005). The same accounts for Hugary where no statutory Guranteeds Minimum 
Income as such is available but where numerous similar provisions exits for 
certain groups (e.g elderly, disabled etc) (Cerami, 2005). 
 
Table 2. Decision-making power of local governments in 15 OECD countries on net incomes 
































Source: own data (see methodological notes) 
 
 
6. Methodological notes 
 
6.1 The model family approach 
 
In the paragraphs that follow, we shall analyse the degree of variation that exists 
in the social effectiveness of universal minimum income protection in OECD 
countries on the basis of the available literature on decentralisation and 
redistribution. Social adequacy is measured in terms of net disposable income of 
general social assistance claimants as a percentage of the poverty line. However, 
Natscha Van Mechelen & Veerle De Maesschalck  18 
  
the social effectiveness of a benefit system is, of course, not only dependent upon 
the benefit levels, but also upon the accessibility and take-up of benefits. 
Therefore, effectiveness of a social benefit  is often calculated by comparing pre- 
and post-transfer income. Yet in the case of universal social assistance schemes – 
and social assistance schemes in general – calculating such a comparative 
indicator for a large number of countries is not a straightforward proposition, 
given the limitations of existing comparative income surveys. Most comparative 
international studies into the adequacy of social assistance benefits are 
consequently restricted to just a handful of countries (see Behrendt, 2002; Hölsch 
and Krause, 2004; Kuivalainen, 2005). In the present paper, too, the focus is 
limited to a single crucial element for determining the effectiveness of universal 
social assistance, namely the social adequacy of benefit amounts.  
 
For many countries, the net income of claimants on general social assistance can 
be estimated using the model family method. The model family approach 
basically involves calculating the financial consequences of fiscal and social 
policies for a set of hypothetical families7. The OECD uses this technique in the 
Benefits and Wages series for the annual estimates of the incomes of four 
hypothetical families (single person and couple, without and with two children). 
The OECD defines the net disposable income of social assistance recipients as 
total cash benefits minus total taxes (OECD, 2004)8. Cash benefits for social 
assistance recipients include minimum income benefits generally excluding any 
strictly housing-related parts, housing benefits generally including any strictly 
housing related parts of minimum income programmes, family benefits and lone 
parent benefits . In-kind benefits (such as free school meals, subsidised 
transport, free health care, etc) are excluded. An exception is made for food 
stamps in the United States, since the OECD considers them to correspond closely 
to social assistance benefits paid in other countries.  
 
The main drawback of the model family approach is that the results obtained are 
illustrative rather than representative (Bradshaw and Finch, 2002). They provide 
insight into the income position of a limited number of household types with a 
very specific spending pattern. After all, the amounts granted in financial benefits 
depend directly on real costs, so that the latter need to be specified unequivocally 
(e.g. housing allowances are a function of rent paid in many countries). In the 
                                                 
7
 For an extensive discussion of the model family approach, see Van Mechelen et al 2004. This paper 
also served as a reference for an outline of the method in Atkinson et al, 2005.  
8
 The income components which are taken into account in the net disposable income, as well as the 
basic assumptions made, are described in detail in OECD, 2004 (Annex A).  
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OECD estimates, assumptions regarding consumption patterns are avoided as 
much as possible, except in the case of housing. This implies that in-kind 
benefits, childcare allowances and the like are left out of consideration. However, 
the downside of this restriction of the number of assumptions made is that the 
OECD results do not take into account that what households have to pay for out 
of their after-tax income varies markedly across countries9.  
 
A further drawback in the context of an analysis of the impact of decentralisation 
is that the OECD estimates for countries without a national law or guidelines on 
social benefit amounts are based on a ‘typical’ region or locality, while we are 
interested precisely in the effect of decentralisation on the minimal guaranteed 
income in a given country. In other words, we wish to ascertain how adequate 
the protection is in the least generous region or locality of a country. Therefore, 
we have adapted the OECD estimates for some countries, basing our approach on 
basic social assistance rates not in an average region, but in one of the less 
generous regions. As the calculation of housing allowances is usually rather 
untransparent and therefore hard to replicate, we have however retained the 
OECD estimates for these allowances, even for countries where each region 
applies its own system. We rely on the basic rates in the province of Salzburg in 
the case of Austria, on those applied in the province of Manitoba for Canada, on 
the so-called category-II municipalities for Finland, on the states of Meckelnburg-
Vorpommern, Saxony and Thuringia for Germany, on the region of  Murcia for 
Spain, and on the minimum norms of the SCIAS in the case of  Switzerland. 
Although Poland is not a federal state, the OECD estimate for this country was 
also adjusted because it is based on a maximum benefit. In  our analysis, the 
data for Poland are based on the minimum benefit. The figure for Norway was 
retained as we know from comparison with other estimates (see Cantillon et al, 
2003 and the Nososco website10) that the OECD estimate of the income of a 
social assistance claimant is already rather low.  
 
6.2 Fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis 
 
Thanks to the model family approach, we have at our disposal estimates of the 
net disposable income of general social assistance claimants in some twenty 
OECD countries. In order to gain insight into the relationship between the degree 
                                                 
9
 For an example of a study based on the model family approach which does take into account this 
aspect, see Bradshaw and Finch, 2002. 
10
 http://www.nom-nos.dk/nososco.htm 
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of decentralisation and the level of minimum income protection, we make use of a 
method that is appropriate for such an intermediate-N situation, namely 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). QCA is a case-oriented research method 
that tries to connect specific outcomes with complex patterns of causality by 
means of Boolean algebra (Ragin, 2000). QCA offers researchers a tool for 
systematically comparing configurations of explanatory variables for the presence 
or absence of a particular outcome. The method has the important advantage 
that it allows one to formulate causal claims without requiring a very substantial 
number of cases (De Meur & Rihoux, 2002). Moreover, these conditional 
statements are always formulated in such a manner that they reflect the diversity 
and the complexity of social reality. Causation is typically understood 
conjuncturally, in terms of combinations of conditions, which makes  QCA 
particularly suitable for explaining complex social phenomena at macro and at  
meso level (Yamasaki & Spreitzer, 2006). These two advantages probably explain 
the growing success of the method in policy analysis in general, and also in  
welfare state research (Kvist, 2006; Ragin, 2000; Rottiers et al, 2006) and 
research into systems  of minimum income protection in particular (Nelson, 2003; 
Morreira, 2006). The purpose of the present paper is to ascertain which 
configurations of power transfer constitute a foundation for socially adequate or 
socially inadequate benefits.  
 
QCA was originally intended for dichotomous variables. In the present paper, we 
use the multi-value fuzzy set variant fsQCA. It offers the same benefits as QCA, 
but is founded on a broader empirical basis than QCA (Ragin, 2006). FsQCA takes 
as its starting point not classical variables but fuzzy set scores that indicate to 
what extent   a case belongs to a particular set. In appendix, we have added a 
table with all the fuzzy set scores. To determine the fuzzy set scores for social 
adequacy of general social assistance benefits, we first defined three breakpoints 
or qualitative anchors and subsequently calculated the scores using the 
calibration technique described in Ragin (2007). The breakpoints correspond with 
the fuzzy set scores 0.007, 0.500 and 0.993. These scores indicate respectively 
full non-membership, the crossover point and full membership in the set of 
countries with adequate social assistance benefits. Countries were attributed a 
fuzzy set score of 0.5 on their outcome variable if, on average11, the net 
disposable income of social assistance claimants corresponds exactly with the 
poverty line (50% of equivalised median income (using the square root of 
                                                 
11
 I.e. the average for the four household types for which the OECD estimates the net disposable 
income.  
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households)12). For full membership, net disposable income should be 10% above 
the poverty line, while for full non-membership it should be 10% below. The fuzzy 
set scores which indicate the social inadequacy of social assistance benefits in a 
given country are simply the complement of the membership score in the set of 
countries with social adequate benefits.  
 
In order to gain insight into the precise distribution of competencies, we make 
use of  12 fuzzy sets (i.e. variables): 3 for the competencies of the substates and 
9 for the competencies of the local authorities. The scores on the first three 
indicate for the principal income components of social assistance recipients – the 
basic rate, housing benefits and other supplementary benefits13 – to what extent 
they are determined by the substates. These fuzzy set scores may assume four 
distinct values: 0.007 if the  substates have no formal competency, 0.25 if they 
have very limited competency (e.g. in 2004 the German states could set their 
own benefit amounts, but within the relatively strict guidelines issued by the 
central government), 0.75 if the level of autonomy is substantial (e.g. the US 
States are able to largely determine their own course within the TANF programme 
and they are moreover empowered to organise additional social assistance 
schemes) and 0.993 if the substate can pursue a quasi-autonomous social 
assistance policy. For the countries that score highly on these three indicators 
(i.e. Austria, Canada, Spain, Switzerland and the US), it is hard to determine to 
what extent local authorities are involved in social assistance programmes, as this 
may vary substantially from substate to substate. For the other  OECD countries, 
we determined the competencies of the local authorities by means of 9 fuzzy 
sets. For each of the three most significant income components of social 
assistance recipients, they indicate which competencies have been transferred to 
the local authority level. A distinction is made here between 3 aspects of  
decentralisation: the transfer of respectively administrative, financial and 
decision-making powers. This results in 9 fuzzy sets, the scores of which may 
again assume 4 different values: 0.007 if the local authority has been assigned no 
formal competency, 0.25 if the autonomy of the local authority is very limited 
(e.g. if the local authority is bound by a national guideline to provide a housing 
allowance that covers the rent cost fully insofar as the rent is deemed to be 
reasonable (Germany, Finland and Sweden)) or if the financial accountability of 
                                                 
12
 Source: OECD, 2004. 
13
 A fourth substantial income source for social assistance recipients, at least in the case of households 
with children, is child benefit. Except in Canada, rate-setting and granting of child benefits is always 
taken care of by the central government. Because of this lack of variation, this variable was not 
included in the analyses.   
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the municipalities is no higher than 32% of the total cost, 0.75 if the autonomy of 
the municipality is substantial (e.g. the central government helps arrange a 
number of supplements, but leaves the organisation of others entirely to the local 
authorities) or if the financial responsibility is considerable (33 to 90% of the total 
cost) and 0.993 if the local authority enjoys quasi-autonomy in  implementation, 
decision-making or funding. These fuzzy set scores were assigned on the basis of 
national reports drawn up for the purpose of the OECD’s Benefits and Wages 
series, the Mutual Information System on Social Protection of the European 
Commission and national data (particularly from websites of institutions involved 
in the regulation or implementation of the benefits analysed).  
 
By combining the OECD data with the fsQCA method, we are able to include 23 
countries in our analysis. The OECD provides estimates of both the net disposable 
income of social assistance benefit recipients and the poverty line for 20 
countries. Furthermore, the fsQCA approach enables us to include a number of 
negative cases, i.e. countries where the guaranteed minimum income is zero, as 
central government leaves the provision of social assistance programmes entirely 
to the regional or local authorities, but without any obligations. This is the case in 
Italy, Hungary and Greece.  In a classical regression analysis, these countries 
would most likely be regarded as outliers and consequently be excluded from 
further analyses. In fsQCA, they are assigned a score of 0 on the outcome 
variable and very high scores on the fuzzy sets for the competencies of local 
authorities. Japan, Iceland, Luxembourg, Korea and the Slovak Republic could not 
be included in the analysis for lack of a comparative poverty standard. Mexico 
and Turkey, for their part, were excluded on grounds of inadequate information 
on the precise distribution of competencies.  
 
Two fuzzy set analyses were carried out. First, we ascertained for all 23 countries 
which distribution of competencies between central government and the 
substates is linked with socially adequate or, as the case may be, socially 
inadequate benefits. Subsequently, for the 17 countries where the substates play 
no or a very modest role in social assistance policy, we examined which 
competency transfers from the central to the local government level are related 
to socially adequate or, as the case may be, socially inadequate social assistance 
benefits.  
 
Given that fsQCA is a very recent analyses method (developed only in the 
1990s), we assume that not all readers are familiar with its underlying logic, the 
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concepts applied and the notation. Therefore, in the discussion of results, we shall 
rely as much as possible on self-explanatory plots and try to avoid fsQCA jargon. 
For those readers who are familiar with the fsQCA approach, we briefly elucidate 
the formal criteria applied in the analysis of the truth tables. The truth tables 
(containing only those configurations for which the number of cases amounts to 
at least 1) and the solutions derived from them are provided in appendix14.  
The following combinations of conditions are assumed to meet the requirements 
for sufficient or necessary causation:   
- The configuration of conditions occurs in at least 3 cases. This implies that 
evidence from just one or two countries is not deemed enough to speak of 
sufficient or necessary causation.  
- The consistency of the configuration is greater than .75. Consistency is a 
measure of the extent to which the fuzzy set scores for a particular 
combination of conditions satisfy the basic requirements for a necessary or a 
sufficient condition. A combination of conditions is necessary for a given 
outcome if, for each case, the membership score in this combination is 
smaller than or equal to the membership score in the outcome variable. A 
configuration of conditions is sufficient if, for each case, the membership score 
in this combination is greater than or equal to the membership score in the 
outcome variable. The consistency measure used takes into account both the 
number of cases meeting and not meeting these requirements as well as the 
extent to which this is the case (for method of calculation, see Ragin, 2006b).  
- The raw coverage of the configuration is greater than .20. Coverage measures 
for each combination of causal conditions its contribution or significance in the 
total set of outcomes. Again, the measure used takes into account both the 
number of cases and the size of the fuzzy set scores (for method of 
calculation, see Ragin, 2006b).  
On the basis of the configurations that meet these three criteria, we propose the 
solution that either maximises the parsimony or ties in most closely with the most 
parsimonious logical equation, and maximises the number of countries for which 




                                                 
14
 The truth tables in appendix ascertain for each configuration the extent to which the fuzzy set scores 
meet the requirements for causal sufficiency. The tables can, however, also be used to ascertain the 
causal necessity of each configuration, as, in this table, the coverage indicator is equal to the 
consistency measure for assessing the necessity of the configuration, and because, conversely, the 
consistency measure for sufficiency is equal to the coverage measure for necessity.   
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7. Empirical results 
 
The annual net disposable income of general social assistance recipients, 
expressed in purchasing power parities, varies from approximately USD 260 per 
month  in Slovakia to USD 1,650 in Luxembourg (Cantillon et al, forthcoming). In 
figure 1, this income from social assistance is compared with the poverty line, 
defined here as 50% of the median standardised household income in the country 
in question.  According to this poverty threshold, social assistance benefits 
provide adequate protection against poverty in only 8 countries: Germany, 
Ireland, Australia, Denmark, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands 
and Finland. In Belgium and Switzerland, the income of social assistance 
recipients lies up to 5% below the poverty line. In the Czech Republic, France and 
Norway, it lies up to 25% below the poverty line, and in Portugal, Poland, 
Canada, Spain and the US it lies even further below. In the US – where the 
federal government only provides food stamps for families without children – the 
social assistance income amounts to less than 30% of the aforementioned 
poverty line. Italy, Greece and Hungary, for their part, have no universal 
minimum income scheme (and have therefore not been included in figure 1). 
 
If we consider the degree to which the social assistance programmes in the 
countries in figure 1 have been decentralised (tables 1 and 2), we notice that all 
countries with adequate benefits belong either to the group where social 
assistance programmes are run almost exclusively by the central government 
(Australia, New Zealand, UK and Ireland), or to the group where social assistance 
schemes have been devolved to the municipal level through co-financing 
schemes, but where the power of decision of those municipalities is quite limited, 
given that either the amounts involved are imposed nationally or strict guidelines 
are issued regarding both basic rates and housing allowances for social assistance 
recipients (the Netherlands, Finland, Denmark and Germany). Conversely, the 
countries where universal  minimum income protection is found to be inadequate 
to prevent income poverty are those where the regional or local authorities are 
granted ample room to devise local social assistance policy. In the United States, 
Italy, Spain and Canada, minimum income entitlements for the needy but 
capacitated are determined at substate level. In Greece, Hungary , Poland and 
Norway this decision-making competency lies primarily with the municipalities.  
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Figure 1. Net social assistance benefits as percentage of poverty line*, 
20 OECD countries**, 2004 
 
* as measured by 50% of equivalised median income (using the square root of 
household size) 
** Italy, Greece and Hungary are not included as these countries have no 
universal minimum income. Iceland, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Turkey 
and the Slovak Republic are not included because of data issues (see 
methodological note).  
Source: OECD. 
 
The results of the fsQCA, as presented in tables 3 and 4, are in line with these 
observations. According to the fsQCA, two combinations of causal conditions are 
necessary for socially adequate benefits. The first condition concerns the transfer 
of competencies to the sublevel, the second relates to the decentralisation of the 
social assistance system to the municipal level. The first condition for adequate 
social assistance benefits is that the central government should not transfer 
substantial decision-making competency on social assistance benefits to the 
substates. In all countries where general safety nets are entirely (Austria, 
Canada, Italy, Spain) or largely (Switzerland and the US) developed at substate 
level, social assistance benefits are below the poverty line (see table 3). A 
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restricted role for the substates is thus a necessary condition for adequate 
benefits. It is however not a sufficient condition. In many countries, including 
Belgium, Hungary, Norway and Portugal, the substates are not or barely involved 
in social assistance policy, yet the guaranteed minimum income in these countries 
is low in comparison with the poverty line. Table 4 illustrates an additional 
condition for adequate social assistance benefits. The role of municipalities should 
also be limited. In all countries where municipalities can decide largely 
autonomously on the level of social assistance incomes – be it because they have 
the competency to set either basic rates (Norway, Poland) or housing allowances  
(Belgium, Portugal) or both (Greece, Hungary) – benefit levels are very low.  Only 
in countries where the central government sets the basic rates and strictly 
regulates housing allowances for social assistance recipients is the net 
guaranteed income of social assistance claimants on or above the poverty line.  
 
Table 3. Substate decision-making power on social assistance programmes and the 
adequacy of social assistance benefit levels in 23 OECD countries (2004) 
 
 Substate decision-making 
power on basic rates and 
supplementary benefits 
No substate decision-making 
power on basic rates and 
supplementary benefits 
Adequate benefit levels  Australia, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, UK 
Inadequate benefit levels Austria, Canada, Italy, Spain, 
Switzerland, US 
Belgium, Czech R., France, 
Greece, Hungary,  Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Sweden 
Source: see methodological notes 
 
 
Table 4. Local decision-making power on social assistance programmes and the adequacy 
of social assistance benefit levels in 17 OECD countries (2004) 
 
 Local decision-making power 
on basic rates or housing 
benefits 
No local decision-making 
power on basic rates and 
housing benefits 
Adequate benefit levels  Australia, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, UK 
Inadequate benefit levels Belgium, Greece, Hungary,  
Norway, Poland, Portugal 
Czech R., France, Sweden 




Comment:  In tabel 1 staat 
Frankrijk bij de landen waar de 
bijstandsprogramma’s gedelegeerd 
zijn naar substate level. De 
combinatie van tables 1 en 3 is 
verwarrend!!! 




Given the diversity in theoretical models on the impact of decentralisation on 
income redistribution and benefit levels, as well as the lack of unequivocal 
empirical data, it is very hard to predict benefit levels on the basis of the 
distribution of competencies between the central, substate and local government 
levels. The most obvious conclusion is perhaps that the adequacy of social 
assistance programmes is enhanced by mixed forms of decentralisation, i.e. 
neither a strictly centralist organisation nor an entirely decentralised approach 
seems to improve programme adequacy. Even the World Bank, which constantly 
emphasises that local levels of government are best informed about the needs 
and requirements of the local citizenry and thus best able to pursue an efficient 
anti-poverty policy, believes that there is a crucial role to be played in social 
assistance programmes by central government.   
Through earmarked financing, the central government should ensure that each 
municipality has enough financial resources at its disposal to implement a social 
assistance programme, and indeed uses these resources to that end (World Bank, 
2007). In other words, the World Bank pleads for a very limited form of 
devolution (i.e. the type of decentralisation whereby financial responsibility is also 
transferred to the local level of government).  
 
The results of our study confirm that adequate social assistance benefit levels 
indeed are not attained in countries with entirely decentralised social assistance 
regimes, but rather in countries with mixed systems or limited forms of 
devolution. In OECD countries where social assistance programmes are organised 
entirely at the regional or the local level, guaranteed minimum income is 
invariably below the poverty line. By contrast, countries where the involvement of 
local authorities in the administration (Netherlands) and/or funding (Denmark, 
Germany and Finland) of social assistance is substantial, yet restricted under 
central legislation or guidelines, the level of basic rates and housing allowances 
for social assistance recipients is invariably adequate.   In Denmark, Germany 
and Finland, the municipal authorities actually enjoy quite a large degree of 
autonomy: municipalities are able to adjust social assistance benefit levels to 
local needs and requirements because they can decide quite independently  on 
entitlement to and the levels of supplementary benefits towards covering the cost 
of heating insurance and the like. Yet the national regulation with regard to rate-
setting prevents the municipalities from providing the poor with ‘poor’ benefits.  
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Moreover, the analyses yielded evidence of a second group of countries with high 
social assistance benefit levels, namely those countries where the transfer of 
competencies has been restricted to institutions which fall under the direct control 
of the central government. In Ireland, the UK, Australia and New Zealand, the 
regional and local authorities are excluded almost entirely from the development 
and implementation of general social assistance programmes. And in each of 
these countries, the combination of the basic rate for social assistance recipients, 
housing allowances and, as the case may be, family allowances is above the 
poverty line.  
 
Although our findings confirm that generous safety nets occur only in OECD 
countries with limited forms of decentralisation, they clearly contradict the 
recommendations of the World Bank. Unlike asserted in those recommendations, 
central funding of social assistance rates does not suffice to prevent that ‘poor 
regions produce poor regimes’. In Portugal, the Czech Republic and France, social 
assistance rates are after all organised nationally, yet benefit levels for all citizens 
are very low (table 5). On the other hand, the Finnish system with substantial 
local responsibility for social expenditures does not result in inadequate benefits 
in the most deprived, simply because national guidelines will not allow this to 
happen.    
 
Table 5. Central funding of social assistance programmes and the adequacy of social 
assistance benefit levels in 23 OECD countries (2004) 
 
 Central funding of basic social 
assistance rates 
No (or limited)* central 
funding of basic social 
assistance rates 
Adequate benefit levels Australia, Ireland, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, UK 
Denmark, Finland, Germany 
Inadequate benefit levels Czech R., France, Portugal, US Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Norway, 
Poland, Sweden 
* Regional or local governments bear at least one-third of the financial burden of the social assistance 
programme.  
Source: see methodological notes 
 
Our findings also refute the theoretical models which assume that there is greater 
solidarity within smaller entities and that therefore decentralisation will enhance 
distribution of wealth towards the poor, at least insofar as this can be measured 
in terms of higher social assistance levels. Certainly in Norwegian villages, the 
connectedness between rich and poor citizens is not always sufficient to result in 
a local social assistance regime with adequate benefit levels. The same holds for 
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the Spanish regions or the Canadian provinces. Theories regarding the positive 
relationship between decentralisation and efficiency are less easily falsified on the 
basis of our results. After all, our dependent variable, i.e. social assistance benefit 
levels, says little about the degree of efficiency of the social assistance system. 
This is apparent from the analysis by Hölsch and Krause (2004), who conclude 
that the strongly centralised social assistance regime in the UK is highly effective. 
In terms of percentage, the reduction in poverty achieved is greater than the 
corresponding figure for France, Germany, Finland or Italy. This is probably due 
in part to the generosity of benefits. However, if one considers the relationship 
between the relative poverty reduction and the proportion of social assistance 
expenditure in GDP, it appears the British system is one of the least efficient.   
 
Our findings correspond most closely with the theoretical models in which it is 
postulated that decentralisation leads to a ‘race to the bottom’ as a result of 
mutual competition between regions and municipalities. After all, we only 
encounter social assistance benefits above the poverty line in countries where 
regions and municipalities cannot decide entirely autonomously on guaranteed 
minimum income levels.    
 
When Central and Eastern European countries opt for decentralisation as an 
instrument of poverty alleviation – due to a better targeting of benefits -, 
prudence is called for the fact that there might be a trade-off between the 
transfer of competencies to lowel levels of government and the generosity of 
welfare programmes. 
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Australia None None None None  
Austria B H S - - -  
Belgium None B H S B H S* H S * Basic rate: 50% 
Canada B H S - - -  
Czech R. None B H S S S  
Denmark None B H S B H S* S * Basic rate and housing benefit: 50 % 
Finland None B H S B H S* H S* * Transfer from central government covers local social 
expenditures only partially;  central guideline imposes 
full subsidising of rent cost, insofar as rent amount is 
reasonable. 
France B H S* B H S None None * Administration only 
Germany B* B H S   * Funding: largely by municipalities, rest by the 
Länder; Decision-making: central guideline specifies 
which costs should be covered by basic rate and 
housing benefit, and mentions possible supplementary  
benefits – within these boundaries of these guidelines, 
the Länder are free to determine the basic rate and 
the municipalities the housing allowances and other 
supplementary benefits 
Greece None B H S B H S B H S  
Hungary None B H S B H S  B H S  
Iceland None B H S B S B S* * Central system of housing allowances; Central 
guideline for basic rates and supplements 
Ireland None None None None  
Italy B H S - - -  
Japan None B H S B H S* None * 25% of social expenditures 
Luxemb. None None None None  
Netherl. None B S B S* B S* * Transfer from central government largely covers 
local social expenditures; central system of housing 
allowances; national social assistance act leaves little 
room for municipal supplements 
New Zeal. None None None None  
Norway None B H S B S* B S*  * Transfer from central government covers local social 
expenditures only partially; central system of housing 
allowances; central guidelines for basic rates 
Poland None B H S B S B S* * National government determines minimum and 
maximum basic rate, which differ quite substantially 
Portugal None B H S H S H S  
Slovak R. None None None None  
Spain B H S - - -  
Sweden None B H S B H S* B H S* *  Transfer from central government covers social 
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expenditures only partially; central guideline specifies 
which costs the basic rate and housing benefit should 
cover and mentions possible supplementary benefits 
Switzerl. B H S* - - - * In accordance with central guidelines 
UK None None None None  
US B S* - - - * Besides the federal Food Stamp Programme, federal 
housing vouchers and federal TANF guidelines 
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Appendix 1: Fuzzy set scores 
 Substate competencies Local competencies Social  






























Australia 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.988 
Austria 0.993 0.993 0.993 - - - - - - - - - 0.157 
Belgium 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.007 0.993 0.993 0.750 0.993 0.993 0.181 
Canada 0.993 0.993 0.993 - - - - - - - - - 0.000 
Czech R. 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.007 0.007 0.993 0.007 0.007 0.993 0.036 
Denmark 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.007 0.007 0.993 0.750 0.750 0.993 0.968 
Finland 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.007 0.250 0.750 0.750 0.750 0.750 0.766 
France 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.024 
Germany 0.250 0.007 0.007 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.007 0.250 0.750 0.750 0.750 0.750 0.997 
Greece 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.000 
Hungary 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.750 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.000 
Ireland 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.990 
Italy 0.993 0.993 0.993 - - - - - - - - - 0.000 
Netherlands 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.993 0.007 0.993 0.250 0.007 0.250 0.250 0.007 0.250 0.861 
New Zealand 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.920 
Norway 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.750 0.007 0.993 0.750 0.007 0.750 0.001 
Poland 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.750 0.007 0.993 0.750 0.007 0.993 0.000 
Portugal 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.750 0.993 0.993 0.007 0.993 0.993 0.007 0.993 0.993 0.000 
Spain 0.993 0.993 0.993 - - - - - - - - - 0.000 
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Sweden 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.250 0.250 0.750 0.750 0.750 0.750 0.264 
Switzerland 0.750 0.750 0.750 - - - - - - - - - 0.422 
UK 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.993 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.892 
US 0.750 0.007 0.993 - - - - - - - - - 0.000 
Name of variabele: Sasub Hbsub Supsub Adsaloc Adhbloc Adsupploc Desaloc Dehbloc Desupploc Fusaloc Fuhbloc Fusupploc Po4 
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Appendix 2 Assessment of causal sufficiency 
 
1. Outcome : socially adequate social assistance benefit levels 
 
a) Truth table 1: 
 







0 0 0 18 0.44 0.93 
1 1 1 4 0.17 0.08 
1 0 1 1 0.30 0.04 
 
 
b) Solution 1:  PO4  sasub * supsub  
(consistency = 0.93 & coverage = 0.44) 
 
 




























0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0.78 0.38 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.73 0.13 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.76 0.11 
1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0.42 0.14 
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 4 0.83 0.33 
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.62 0.13 
1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.54 0.13 
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 0.06 0.01 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 0.03 0.01 
 
d) Solution 2:  PO4   desaloc * dehbloc  
(consistency = 0.93 & coverage = 0.70) 
 
 
2. Outcome : socially inadequate social assistance benefit levels 
 
a) Truth table 1: 
 







0 0 0 18 0.58 0.71 
1 1 1 4 0.92 0.24 
1 0 1 1 1 0.08 
 




b) Solution 1:  SASUB * SUPSUB  po4  
(consistency = 0.93 & coverage = 0.29) 
 
 




























0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0.25 0.09 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.34 0.05 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.45 0.05 
1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0.80 0.20 
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 4 0.36 0.11 
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.84 0.13 
1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.86 0.16 
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 1.00 0.15 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1.00 0.29 
 
d) Solution 2:  DESALOC + DEHBLOC  po4 
(consistency = 0.93 & coverage = 0.69) 
(most parsimonious solution) 
 
